Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

The State of Utah v. Dwayne Marvin Carlson :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham, attorney for appellee.
Linda M. Jones, Rebecca Hyde; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, The State of Utah v. Dwayne Marvin Carlson, No. 960135 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/94

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

I N

T H E

U T A H

C 0 U R T

0 F

A

pp

E A L S

T H E S T A T E O F I JTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DWAYNE MARVIN

CARLSON;

., I\D. 9 6 0 1 3 5 - C A
rxxority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

R E P L Y B R I E F OF
Appeal

APPELLANT

from a judgment of c o n v i c t i o n

Ti: ai isf e r r i i lg St. oJ.en I ropert. )

for R e c e i v i n g

and

i i second d e g r e e f <v iony

v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann.. § 41 - l a - 1 3 1 6 (2)

(1993),

In t l le T h i i d

iJudi c i a l D i s t r i c t Court in and f o r S a l t Lake C o u n t y , S t a t e of
Utah , t h e H o n o r a b l e i\i I III'.. U t i ci.i i, J i MJL|I.-' , p I. en id i rig.
L I N D A M. J u W E S , # 5 4 9 7
R E B E C C A C. H Y D E , #64 09
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 S o u t h , S u i t e 300
Salt L a k e C i t y , U t a h
84111
A t t o r n e y s f or A p p e 11 ai it

JAN G R A H A M
ATTORNEY GENERAL
K R I S C. L E O N A R D
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
H e b e r M. W e l l s B u i l d i n g
16 0 E a s t 300 S o u t h , 6th F l o o r
P. O. B o x 14 0 8 54
Salt L a k e C: ty # Utal
841 1
">4
Attorney

for

Appellee

U f AH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.
^milZ&UjL^

Fl

r*-'.

DEO 23 1996

COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DWAYNE MARVIN CARLSON,

Case No. 960135-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Receiving and
Transferring Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1993), in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge, presiding.
LINDA M. JONES, #5497
REBECCA C. HYDE, #6409
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
KRIS C. LEONARD
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

INTRODUCTION

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I. IN AN ATTEMPT TO SALVAGE THE DEFECTIVE
JURY INSTRUCTION, THE STATE PRESENTS A SERIES OF
ARGUMENTS THAT MISCONSTRUE, MISINTERPRET AND
MISUNDERSTAND THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND RELEVANT
CASE LAW.

2

A. THE STATE'S CLAIM THAT THE ISSUES RAISED
ON APPEAL WERE NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED IS
UNREASONABLE
B. THE STATE'S FIRST "MERITS" ARGUMENT AT
"POINT I.C." EMPLOYS AN INCORRECT ANALYSIS.

3
.

1. Contrary to the State's Assertion,
Graves Does Not Deal with the Issues
Raised in this Matter.
2.

Graves

Is Markedly Distinguishable. .

5

6
6

a. The "sufficiency-of-theevidence" determination should not
be transformed blindly into a jury
instruction.

7

b. The "presumption" identified in
Graves is applicable only when the
defendant has failed to offer an
explanation concerning his
possession of stolen property. . . .

9

3. The State Failed to Employ the
Prejudice Analysis Applicable When
Considering an Erroneous Instruction. . .
C. IN THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO CARLSON'S
CHALLENGES, THE STATE DISREGARDS COMPELLING
INFORMATION AND AUTHORITY.
1. The State's Argument Concerning the
Constitutionality of the Instruction
Lacks Analysis.

11

14

14

Page
a. The State relies on distinguishable cases and erroneous
propositions in its argument that
the Instruction is constitutional. .

14

b. The State incorrectly asserts
that in the context of inferences,
it is appropriate to shift the
burden of proof to the defendant. .

17

2. The State Again Misconstrues Graves
in Support of Its Claim that the
Instruction Comports with Utah Statutory
Law.

19

3. This Court's Ruling in Perez Is
Inapplicable to the Issues in This Case.

20

POINT II. THE STATE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING STATEMENTS AS REFLECTING ON
THE EVIDENCE IS INCORRECT.
CONCLUSION

Addendum A:

23
25

Petition for Writ of Certiorari in State v. Perez

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Barnes v. U.S. . 412 U.S. 837 (1973)

4, 9, 10,
11, 14, 15,
16, 17, 19,
22

Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988)

5

Learv v. U.S. . 395 U.S. 6 (1969)

4, 15, 17

Lego v. Twomev, 404 U.S. 477 (1972)

7, 8

McCartv v. State. 765 P.2d 1215 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1988)

24

State v. Anderson, No. 940149 (Utah
December 13, 1996)

12

State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986)

25

State v. Barretta. 155 P. 343 (Utah 1916)

9, 19

State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989),
cert, denied. 116 S.Ct. 163 (1995)
State v. Chambers. 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985)

24
....

18, 20, 22

State v. Clayton. 658 P.2d 621 (Utah 1983)

22, 23

State v. Crowder. 197 P.2d 917 (Utah 1948)

20, 22

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)
State v. Graves. 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986)
State v. Heath. 492 P.2d 978 (Utah 1972)

....

12, 23, 24
2, 4, 5, 6,
7, 9, 14,
19, 22
22

State v. Hinton. 680 P.2d 749 (Utah 1984),
overruled on other grounds. State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)

7

State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987)

20

iii

Page
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991)

5

State v. Kinsev, 295 P. 247 (Utah 1931)

23

State v. Nichols, 145 P. 2d 802 (Utah 1944)

23

State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1989)
State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1996),
petition for cert, filed (Utah 11/5/96)
(No. 960476)

12, 13

20, 21, 22,
23

State v. Powell, 816 P.2d 86 (Wash. App.
1991), review denied. 824 P.2d 421
(Wash. 1992)

23, 24

State v. Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207 (Utah 1981)

11, 18

State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862 (Utah), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 865 (1993)

5

State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986)

20, 21, 22

State v. Thomas, 244 P.2d 653 (Utah 1952)

23

State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984)

25

State v. Wainwriqht, 856 P.2d 163 (Kan. App.
1993)

23, 24

Tot V. U.S. , 319 U.S. 463 (1943)
U.S. v. Gainev, 380 U.S. 63 (1965)
U.S. v. McLernon. 746 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir.
1984)
U.S. v. Pineda-Ortuno. 952 F.2d 98 (5th Cir.),
cert, denied, 504 U.S. 28 (1992)
U.S. v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965)

15, 17
4

13
12
4, 16, 17

Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 (Utah 1983)

5

Wurst v. Dep't of Employment S e c , 818 P.2d
1036 (Utah App. 1991)

5

iv

Pacre
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
18 U.S.C. § 1708

16

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (1995)

7

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (1995)

19, 20, 22

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1995)

2,3,4,
20, 21

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995)

2, 20

Rule 104, Utah Rules of Evidence

7

v

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 960135-CA
Priority No. 2

DWAYNE MARVIN CARLSON,
Defendant/Appe11ant

In response to the arguments set forth in Appellant Dwayne
Carlson's ("Carlson") initial brief concerning the impropriety of
an instruction submitted to Carlson's jury containing an evidentiary presumption (the "Instruction"), the state makes several
erroneous assertions.

First, the state launches into an unrea-

sonable "preservation-of-the-issues" argument.
("S.B.") at Point I.B.)

(State's Brief

It claims that although trial counsel

timely objected to the defective Instruction on the grounds that
it was inconsistent with statutory law and improper to introduce
to the jury pursuant to Utah case law, and cited to -a case dealing with the constitutionality of evidentiary presumptions, trial
counsel failed to preserve such arguments for appeal purposes.
Second, the state employs a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence"
analysis in assessing the defective Instruction. (S.B. at Point
I.C.)

The analysis is inappropriate, yet serves as the basis for

the state's response on the merits to the issues raised in Carlson's brief. For the reasons set forth in Carlson's briefs and as
supported by the record on appeal, Carlson respectfully requests
the entry of an order vacating the conviction and judgment, and
remanding the case for a new trial.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I. IN AN ATTEMPT TO SALVAGE THE DEFECTIVE JURY
INSTRUCTION, THE STATE PRESENTS A SERIES OF ARGUMENTS
THAT MISCONSTRUE, MISINTERPRET AND MISUNDERSTAND THE
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND RELEVANT CASE LAW,
This case concerns the submission of an instruction to the
jury that is not grounded in Utah statutory or case law.1
Compare the Record on Appeal (MR.fl) at 110 to State v. Graves,
717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986), and Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-402 (1995)
and -408 (1995) .

It permits the jury to find that defendant

"knew" property in his possession was recently stolen (R. at 11012), based merely on the state's evidence that the defendant was
in possession of recently stolen property.

The trial court in

this matter submitted the Instruction to the jury even though
Carlson provided an explanation for his possession of the
property. (R. 110, 207-217.)

The Instruction offends basic

notions of justice and is erroneous. It eliminates the mental

1

To reiterate, the challenged Instruction states the following:
Possession of property recently stolen, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from
which you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light
of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the
case, that the person in possession of the stolen property
stole the property and knew that the property was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in possession of
property, (2) that the property was stolen, (3) that such
possession was not too remote in point of time from the theft,
and (4) that no satisfactory explanation of- such possession
has been given or appears from the evidence, then you may
infer from those facts and find that the defendant stole the
property and knew the property was stolen.
(R. 110, 096, 267-69.) To the extent the Instruction is based on Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-402, it is a distortion of the statute, which provides:
Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory
explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence that the person in possession stole the
property.
2

culpability element necessary to a conviction for "possession" of
stolen property and/or relieves the state of proving that
element. It also requires the defendant to prove innocence.
In response to the issues of error set forth in Carlson's
initial brief (Brief of Appellant, dated July 25, 1996, at Point
I), the state offers a "preservation-of-the-issues" argument,
then shifts to a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" analysis, both of
which are inapplicable in this case. In addressing Carlson's
issues, the state misinterprets case law and fails to distinguish
compelling Utah and federal precedent supporting Carlson's
position.

The state's arguments should be disregarded as set

forth in the initial brief and as further set forth below.
A. THE STATE'S CLAIM THAT THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL WERE
NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED IS UNREASONABLE.
The state correctly asserts that when the prosector
introduced the defective Instruction on the day of trial (R. 7287), counsel for Carlson interposed a timely objection and
stated, among other things, that the Instruction was a distortion
of the inapplicable statutory presumption set forth at Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-402, "that possession of property recently stolen is
prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the
property" (R. 267-69) see note 1, supra; the language of the
Instruction went beyond the statutory language of § 76-6-4 02 by
creating an evidentiary presumption for a "possession" charge;
and Utah case law prohibited use of such instructions since the
statutory presumption would be relevant only to determine
3

"whether there was sufficient evidence to convict," which is a
determination for the court and not for the jury. (Id.); see Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-402.

The trial court interrupted counsel mid-

objection to state the following: "based on the [trial court's]
reading of [State v. Graves, 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986), the]
objection is noted but overruled."

(R. 268.)

Significantly, the

Graves case, which the trial court "read[] M and "based" its
decision on, considered limitations on the statutory presumption
at issue, its use by the courts to determine "whether there was
sufficient evidence to convict," and its validity under the
federal constitution.

Graves, 717 P.2d at 717 ("[The use of the

statutory presumption] does not offend the federal constitution"
(citing Barnes v. U.S., 412 U.S. 837 (1973), which analyzed an
evidentiary presumption under Leary v. U.S., 395 U.S. 6 (1969);
U.S. v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), and U.S. v. Gainey, 380 U.S.
63 (1965))) .
Thus, on appeal Carlson has challenged the Instruction as an
improper expansion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 02 (Brief of
Appellant at Point I.A.); as a misuse of the statutory presumption (id. at Point I.B.); and as unconstitutional (id. at Point
I.C.).

The state asserts Carlson preserved only two narrowly-

defined issues: that the statutory presumption did not apply
because Carlson was not charged with theft, and Graves is not
controlling. The state's argument is illogical and lacks
analysis. Carlson has adequately preserved all issues.
The purpose of preserving objections is set forth in Utah

4

case law:
The requirement of a specific objection on the record
ensures that the trial court will understand the basis
of the objections and have an opportunity to correct
any errors before the case goes to the jury.
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988); Utah County v.
Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) (fl[I]n order to preserve a
plea of error, the alleged error must have been raised seasonably
by counsel to the trial court . . .

to allow the trial court to

correct any error, if error there be"); Wurst v. Dep't of
Employment Sec., 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah App. 1991) (issue
sufficiently raised where mentioned in letter to department which
served as appeal of A.L.J.'s decision).
In this case, the preservation concerns were served, where
counsel raised the issues and the trial court took the
opportunity to rule on the matter, overruling the objection based
on its "reading" of Graves. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150,
1161 (Utah 1991) (no waiver when trial court addresses merits of
issue); State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah), cert, denied,
510 U.S. 865 (1993). The issues surrounding the impropriety of
the Instruction have been properly preserved making it
unnecessary for Carlson to "argue manifest injustice or plain
error."

(S.B. at 15.) The matter must now be resolved on appeal.

B. THE STATED FIRST "MERITS" ARGUMENT AT "POINT I.C."
EMPLOYS AN INCORRECT ANALYSIS.
The state focuses its first "merits" argument on that
portion of the Instruction that permitted "the jury to presume
[Carlson] stole the truck, [even though Carlson] was not charged
5

with theft or larceny." See note 1, supra, (S.B. at Point I.e.,
p. 15-25) .2

The state's argument on that issue is somewhat

disjointed, as set forth below.
1. Contrary to the State's Assertion, Graves
Deal with the Issues Raised in this Matter.

Does Not

The state first asserts that the Utah Supreme Court in
Graves "dispose[d]" of the issue concerning whether it is
permissible to submit a presumption instruction to a jury in a
possession case.

(S.B. at 15-16.)

Yet as the state later

acknowledges (S.B. at 17), Graves is not an "instruction" case.
11

[T] he sole point raised on cippeal [in Graves] is insufficiency

of the evidence to prove that defendant knew or had reason to
believe the property was stolen."

Graves, 717 P.2d at 717.

Graves considers whether it is appropriate for a court

to take

into account an evidentiary presumption, similar to that which is
in issue in this case, in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence.

Graves does not address whether such a persumption may

be submitted to a
2.

Graves

jury.

Is Markedly Distinguishable.

The state next makes an illogical leap. It assumes without
discussion that Graves supports the proposition that it is

2

The state makes repeated references to the "theft" portion of the
Instruction as its focus throughout Point I.e. of its brief: S.B. at 1718 ("The question becomes whether use in the instruction of language
permitting an inference that defendant stole the vehicle constitutes
reversible error . . .") ("The absence
of the language relating to
defendant stealing the truck would not change the fact that defendant
admitted [possession] ") ; 20 ("Inasmuch as the jury would still have been
entitled to infer the requisite knowledge to convict defendant absent the
language presuming that he stole the truck, confidence in the verdict is
not undermined").
6

permissible in a possession case to submit an instruction to the
jury that presumes intent based on the factors set forth in the
Instruction at issue.

(R. 110, factors (1), (2), (3) & (4).)

"[A]Ithough Graves did not involve a jury instruction challenge,
it is clear from Graves that the presumption is a factor which
the finder of fact must have at its disposal in making its ultimate determination of guilt." (S.B. at 17.) Again, since Graves
concerned "sufficiency of the evidence" the state has failed to
distinguish between that court-made determination and a jury instruction. That distinction must be recognized.

In addition, the

state has misconstrued the "presumption" identified in Graves.
a. The "sufficiency-of-the-evidence"
determination should not be transformed
blindly into a jury instruction.
Carlson pointed out in his opening brief that the trial
court is responsible for making factual determinations in many
situations.

Courts determine (1) whether evidence must be

suppressed; (2) the qualifications of a person to be a witness,
and similar evidentiary issues, Utah R. Evid. 104; (3) the
voluntariness and admissibility of a confession, State v. Hinton,
680 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1984) (citing Lego v. Twomev, 404 U.S.
477 (1972) (the Sixth Amendment right to a jury does not change
the normal rule that the admissibility of evidence is a question
for the court rather than the jury)), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 n.71 (Utah 1988); and (4)
jurisdiction and venue, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (1995).
While a party may introduce at trial evidence relating to the
7

geographical location of a crime, the evidence does not constitute a relinquishment to the jury of the trial court's obligation
to determine jurisdiction. By the same token, evidence of
possession of recently stolen property should not transform the
court's duty to determine "sufficiency" into a jury charge, even
if the presumption language irequires the jury to make a finding
"beyond a reasonable doubt."

Whatever the language, the

evidentiary determination is for the court.
Stated another way, "court-made" determinations relate to
admissibility, presentation and sufficiency of evidence adduced
at trial.

The responsibility to determine such issues is not

given to juries for many reasons: The court controls the
proceedings; ensures orderliness, fairness, and impartiality,
among other things; and is presumed skillful and knowledgeable
with respect to the rules governing procedure and in considering
evidentiary matters. Not so with juries. Juries are not empowered
with determining evidentiary sufficiency and admissibility issues
because it is doubtful they could make such determinations
reliably.

See Lego, 404 U.S. at 483.

influenced by improper considerations.

Juries likely would be
For that reason, rules

that apply to evidentiary questions of law should not be blindly
adhered to in considering the duties of the "jury" and the jury's
limited abilities.
[The sufficiency of the evidence determination] is one of
law and not of fact. When a court submits a case to a jury,
the court necessarily determines that there is sufficient
evidence to justify a conviction. The court cannot leave
that question to a jury. To do so would be to make the jury
judges of both the law and the facts.
8

State v. Barretta, 155 P. 343, 347 (Utah 1916).

For the above-

stated reasons, the sufficiency-of-the-evidence presumption
identified in Graves is a question of law that cannot be blindly
transformed into a question of fact for jury consideration, as
the state suggests.
b. The "presumption" identified in Graves is
applicable only when the defendant has failed
to offer an explanation concerning his
possession of stolen property.
Although the Utah Supreme Court in Graves ruled that in
considering the "sufficiency of the evidence," possession of a
stolen vehicle may raise the inference that the defendant knew
the vehicle was stolen, the inference is raised only where
"[d]efendant did not offer any explanation to the arresting
officer or at the trial that he did not know [the vehicle he
possessed was stolen]. Such failure to explain his possession
raises an inference that he knew the property was stolen."
Graves, 717 P.2d at 717.
Graves is consistent with Barnes, 412 U.S. at 845, where the
United States Supreme Court dealt with a presumption instruction
that "permitted the inference of guilt from
possession of recently stolen property."

unexplained

Id. (emphasis in

original). As set forth in the state's brief (S.B. at 27), the
Supreme Court in Barnes was "deal[ing] with a traditional commonlaw inference deeply rooted in our law.

For centuries courts

have instructed juries that an inference of guilty knowledge may
be drawn from the fact of unexplained
goods."

Id. at 843 (emphasis added).
9

possession

of stolen

Thus, Barnes and Graves

teach that where the defendant fails to explain possession, the
presumption is permissible.
Another conclusion is reached when defendant somehow offers
an explanation: the presumption is impermissible. Any other
result would make the explanation a factor in finding intent,
where the jury would be required to consider whether the
explanation was unsatisfactory before it could draw the inference
of intent.
The Instruction in this matter illustrates the problem when
the defendant offers the explanation and the presumption is given
to the jury.

Here, the Instruction permitted the jury to infer

mental culpability if it found "from the evidence and beyond
reasonable

doubt

...

a

[(1) that defendant was in possession of

property (2) that was stolen (3) recently and] (4) that no
satisfactory explanation of such possession has

been

given

appears from the evidence." (R. 110 (emphasis added).)

or

The

Instruction requires the state to present only evidence of
possession and that the property was recently stolen. (R. 110,
factors (1), (2), & (3)), see note 1, supra. If the jury found
the first 3 factors set forth in the Instruction, it was then
required to consider whether the explanation "given" by Carlson
was not satisfactory beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
presume intent. Thus, in this case proof of intent hinged on the
sufficiency of Carlson's explanation. Barnes, 412 U.S. 846, n.ll
(the practical effect is to shift the burden to the defendant
where "ordinarily the Government's evidence will not provide an
explanation of [defendant's] possession").
10

The burden fell

squarely on Carlson to establish the explanation as "satisfactory" beyond a reasonable doubt in order that intent would not be
presumed.3

The state was relieved of its duty to affirmatively

prove the intent element.
Since the presumption here was impermissible, the Court must
consider the prejudice to Carlson, addressed below.
3. The State Failed to Employ the Prejudice Analysis
Applicable When Considering an Erroneous Instruction.
In lieu of the prejudice analysis, the state employed a
"sufficiency-of-the-evidence" analysis (S.B. at 20-25), further
reflecting the state's inability to distinguish between

"suffi-

ciency of the evidence" and prejudice, which is relevant when
considering an erroneous instruction.

The state proceeded to

"marshal" the evidence presumably in favor of either a possession
or theft conviction, and asserted that the marshalled evidence
served to convict Carlson of possession since the presumption
Instruction permitted the jury to infer mental culpability.
While the Instruction in fact permitted such an inference, the
state's argument rings hollow for want of analysis.

3

While the Court in Barnes noted that "some evidence tending to
explain a defendant's possession consistent with innocence does not bar
instructing the jury on the inference," Barnes, 412 U.S. at 846, n.9,
that dictum is consistent with barring use of the common law inference
when the defendant
actually
offers
an explanation.
The Barnes note
should be construed to define "some evidence" as the surrounding
circumstances as opposed to defendant's evidence going to explanation.
Once defendant offers the explanation, use of the inference would
improperly hold him to a higher standard by requiring him to "prove" the
explanation was satisfactory. That burden on defendant is greater than
requiring him to present "some" proof to negate intent. State v.
Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207, 209-10 (Utah 1981). In this case, the jury was
required to apply a more critical analysis to Carlson's evidence than is
required by the law. The Instruction improperly emphasized the explanation as a critical component of the intent element, relieving the state
of the burden of establishing that element.
11

The state should focus on the prejudice prong relevant to a
claim that an instruction is defective.

Additional evidence

concerning possible mental culpability may be adequate for a
sufficiency challenge, but adds nothing to the fact that the jury
was misinstructed and likely relied on that Instruction to
convict, thereby prejudicing Carlson.4
In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the court
reversed a murder conviction because of an erroneous instruction:
Under the instruction given, the jury could have mistakenly
believed that reckless conduct alone is sufficient to prove
murder in the second degree. Second, because the second degree murder statute does not include the word "recklessness"
in describing the actor's mental state and the man-slaughter
statute does, we think the error should have been obvious to
the trial judge. Third, we find that the error was
prejudicial because we cannot be sure that the jury did not
convict Dunn on the basis of a reckless mental state alone.
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209.

Likewise, in State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d

1329 (Utah 1989), the court considered a jury-instruction issue
4

The state's reliance on U.S. v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 104
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 504 U.S. 28 (1992), in its "marshalling"
argument (S.B. at 25), is misleading. In Pineda-Ortuno, the appellants
"complain[ed] about the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding
the elements of the firearms charges under Sec. 924(c). The indictment
charged appellants only with 'carrying a firearm', but the court
instructed the jury using the phrase 'knowingly used or carried a
firearm.'[] They also challenge[d]
the sufficiency
of the evidence
in
support of their convictions
on these counts."
Id. at 103 (emphasis added) . Thus it was appropriate for the court to marshal the evidence in
favor of the verdict. In addition, this Court should not read State v.
Anderson, No. 940149 (Utah December 13, 1996), to require marshalling of
the evidence in the case of a defective instruction. In Anderson, the
court refused to address defendant's claim that an instruction was error
where the instruction permitted the jury to convict for aggravated sexual
assault if it found defendant acted "recklessly." The defendant waived
any objection in the trial court to the instruction. Slip opinion at 3.
The defendant next argued "it would be manifestly unjust and deny [him]
due process of law to incarcerate him for a crime that should not be
recognized in Utah, i.e. reckless aggravated sexual assault." Id. at 4.
The defendant also acknowledged that the beating and sexual assault at
issue "must statutorily and logically
always be knowing or
intentional."
Id. at 4-5. Defendant's second claim was separate from the "erroneous"
instruction claim, thus treated separately.
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under the prejudice standard.

The defendant argued the instruc-

tion in issue did not reflect the law that voluntary intoxication
may be found to "negate[] the existence of the mental state which
is an element of the offense." Id. at 1331. Thus the court found
the instruction erroneous. Id.

With regard to the prejudice

analysis, the court did not marshal the evidence, but focused
exclusively on the fact that defendant made no contention
ever

at trial that his intoxication negated the "knowledge of or

intent" associated with the offense.

" [D]efendant did not rely

on an intoxication defense as his theory of the case."
1332.

whatso-

Id. at

Thus, the error was harmless.
In considering the harmless standard in this case, the Court

should be quick to find prejudice where Carlson explained his
possession, his defense focused on his lack of mental culpability, and the evidence presented by the state was disputed,
conflicting and circumstantial.

See U.S. v. McLernon, 746 F.2d

1098, 1120 (6th Cir. 1984) (record showed prejudice where "only
disputed circumstantial testimony [existed] about the defendant's
reason for being in Cincinnati and his possible use of the phone
in connection with the cocaine transaction").

There was no

direct evidence that Carlson was aware that the truck was stolen
particularly since it had a damaged front end (R. 207-08), was in
need of repairs (R. 209), and, according to the state's
witnesses, bore no sign of forced entry. (R. 171, 187.)

It is

highly possible the jury simply eliminated all conflicts by
relying on the presumption Instruction to convict Carlson.
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The marshalled evidence is irrelevant.
that Carlson's defense focused on his lack
to commit the offense.

What is relevant is
of mental

culpability

Thus a presumption going to that element

of the offense creates the greatest prejudice.
C. IN THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO CARLSON'S CHALLENGES, THE
STATE DISREGARDS COMPELLING INFORMATION AND AUTHORITY.
The state weaves the "sufficiency of the evidence" analysis
and argument into its response to Carlson's challenges.

That

alone is sufficient reason to reject the state's additional
contentions.

The state's contentions are further faulty.

1. The State's Argument Concerning the
Constitutionality of the Instruction Lacks Analysis.
a. The state relies on distinguishable cases
and erroneous propositions in its argument
that the Instruction is constitutional.
In response to Carlson's argument that the presumption set
forth in the Instruction is irrational and arbitrary (see Brief
of Appellant at Point I.e.3.), the state claims the presumption
is valid " [a]s explained in subsection C, " where it merely cited
to Graves and improperly employed a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence"
analysis (see Point I.B.2. and 3., supra, in reply thereto). The
state then claims the presumption is sound because it requires
the jury "to find each of the underlying facts beyond a
reasonable doubt."

(S.B. at 27.)

By that statement the state

simply recognizes that the Instruction requires the jury to make
findings beyond a reasonable doubt. (R. 110.) That is irrelevant
to the constitutional analysis in the context of this case.
The Court in Barnes did not ask whether the instruction

14

required the jury to make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt,
but whether common sense and experience tell us beyond
reasonable

doubt

a

that based on a specific fact, an inference of

the existence of a second fact may be drawn.

If common sense and

experience tell us that one set of facts will support an innocent
explanation, the instruction fails the due process analysis.
Asked another way, does common sense tell us that a person in
possession of mail addressed to another must have known the mail
was stolen?

Yes, mail bears the identity of the rightful owner.

Barnes, 412 U.S. at 845. Does common sense tell us that
possession of marihuana supports an inference that defendant must
have known it was imported into the United States?

No, common

sense and experience tell us that marihuana is also grown
domestically.

Leary, 395 U.S. at 6.5

5

Another result is reached

The Court in Leary held that mere possession
of marihuana did not
support an inference that defendant had the knowledge concerning a
characteristic particular to that marihuana -- that it was illegally
imported into the United States. The possibility that any given marihuana
was domestically grown made the inference too tenuous.
In another case, Tot v. U.S., 319 U.S. 463 (1943), the Court
considered a statutory presumption that stated "possession of a firearm
or ammunition by [a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence
or is a fugitive from justice] shall be presumptive evidence that such
firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or received." Tot, 319
U.S. at 464. In determining whether proof of the first fact furnished
a rational basis for inference of the existence of the second fact, the
Court stated the inference was "inconsistent with any argument drawn from
experience." Id. at 468. "Whether the statute in question be treated
as expressing the normal balance of probability, or as laying down a rule
of comparative convenience in the production of evidence, it leaves the
jury free to act on the presumption alone once the specified facts are
proved, unless the defendant comes forward with opposing evidence. And
this we think enough to vitiate the statutory provision." Id. at 469.
That same conclusion applies in this case -- Carlson's possession of the
truck is not logically related to the possibility that Carlson knew the
beat-up, dented truck was stolen before he came into possession of it.
Barnes commands a different result because of the nature of the
stolen property. In that case, the defendant was charged with violating
(continued...)
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with heroin, which cannot be grown domestically.

"'Common sense7

. . . tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably
become aware that the product they deal in is smuggled, unless
they practice a studied ignorance to which they are not
entitled." Barnes, 412 U.S. 845, n. 10.

Does common sense tell

us that presence at an illegal still supports an inference that
defendant possessed the still?

No, not without more. Romano, 382

U.S. at 136.
, The state claims that under the Barnes "reasonable-doubt"
test, the Instruction was valid:
Without a satisfactory explanation from defendant for his
possession of the truck, the aggregate of the undisputed
evidence, defendant's admissions, actions, and statements,
his credibility, and the* surrounding circumstances
generally, as set forth in subsection C, supra [which
includes a recitation of the state's conflicting,
disputed.
and circumstantial
evidence], combine to permit a rational
juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew
or reasonably should have known that the truck was stolen.
(S.B. 29.) The state's analysis has little to do with the few
facts identified as forming the presumption here. See note 1,
supra. The state has failed to address how "possession" of a
truck that has a smashed front end (and hence no license plate),
is in disrepair, and recently has been reported as stolen, is

5

(...continued)
18 U.S.C. § 1708, for possessing U.S. treasury checks stolen from the
mails and knowing them to be stolen. The Supreme Court recognized the
characteristics unique to mail that make it obvious that its lawful owner
has been deprived possession.
"The evidence established petitioner
possessed recently stolen Treasury checks payable to persons he did not
know." Barnes, 412 U.S. at 845. The characteristic particular to mail,
obviously, is the identity on the front of the mail of the rightful
owner. In this matter, there was no "addressee" label affixed to the
truck -- thus Carlson had no way to know from the truck itself that it
was stolen before it came into his possession.
16

sufficient to permit a rational juror to presume "beyond a reasonable doubt" that defendant knew the truck was stolen. See U.S.
v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), Learv v. United States, 395 U.S.
6 (1969), and Tot v. U.S., 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The state's argument fails for lack of analysis. The presumption is irrational.
b. The state incorrectly asserts that in the
context of inferences, it is appropriate to
shift the burden of proof to the defendant.
In response to Carlson's claim that the Instruction
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof, the state again
has misconstrued Barnes.

(S.B. at 29.) In that case, the Court

stated without equivocation, "the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did have knowledge that the
property was stolen, an essential element of the crime, remains
on the Government."

Barnes, 412 U.S. 845, n.9. "The burden of

going forward may not be freely shifted to the defendant." Id.
The instruction in Barnes did not "shift the burden" as the
Instruction in this case did.

The Barnes instruction did not

require the jury to consider the defendant's explanation as a
factor in determining intent.

It merely stated that if an

explanation was not offered, and if the jury found "beyond a
reasonable doubt" that defendant possessed the recently stolen
mail with its unique identifying characteristics, the jury could
draw from those facts and common sense the inference that the
defendant knew the mail was stolen. Barnes, 412 U.S. at 840 n.3.
The Instruction in this matter goes well beyond the
permissible.

Here the Instruction required the state to prove
17

only the first three factors:: possession and that the property
was recently stolen.

(R. 110, factors (1), (2) & (3).)

The

Instruction also required the jury to determine beyond a
reasonable doubt whether a satisfactory explanation of possession
had been given or appeared from the evidence.
gave Carlson no choice.

The Instruction

He had to prove the explanation to the

satisfaction of the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt in order
that intent would not be presumed.

Such a provision has not been

considered in any case relied upon by the state.

The Instruction

had the effect of requiring Carlson to prove his innocence
without requiring the state to prove mental culpability.
In addition, the Instruction required the jury to charge
Carlson with the burden of proving a lack of mental culpability
"by some quantum of proof which may well have been considerably
greater than 'some' evidence -- thus effectively shifting the
burden of persuasion on the element of intent."

State v.

Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207, 209-10 (Utah 1981) (cites omitted).
State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah 1985).

He was

required to present an explanation that was satisfactory "beyond
a reasonable doubt."

The Instruction placed the burden on

Carlson to prove innocence.

The language of that provision

coupled with the prosecutor's statement that "[t]he only real
issue here is whether or not you buy his explanation as to how he
gained possession of this property" (R. 272) compel the entry of
an order vacating Carlson's sentence.
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2. The State Again Misconstrues Graves in Support of
Its Claim that the Instruction Comports with Utah
Statutory Law.
The state again relies on its claim that the Instruction
submitted to the jury in this case is consistent with the common
law presumption set forth in Graves and Barnes.
above, that argument is faulty.

As set forth

See Point I.B., supra.

The state also takes liberties with Utah Code Ann. § 76-1503 (1995) . That provision concerns the submission to the jury of
presumptions "established by this code or other penal statute."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503. The state would have this Court read
more into the statute to include "common law" and prosecutorialcreated presumptions.

(S.B. at 30-31.)

If the legislature had intended that all forms and manners
of presumptions would be submitted to juries under Section 76-1503, "it may be presumed it would have said so in language which
readily would convey such a meaning.
not convey that meaning."

The language employed does

Barretta, 155 P. at 346. Indeed, the

legislature has enacted an evidentiary presumption relevant to
"possession" cases. In a case for the offense of receiving stolen
property, the Utah code provides the following:
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or
disposes of the property of another knowing that it has been
stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or
who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing,
selling, or withholding the property from the owner, knowing
the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of
it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1)
is presumed
in the case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property
stolen on a sevarate
occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year
19

preceding the receiving offense charged;
(c) being

a dealer

in property of the sort received,

retained, or disposed, acquires it for a consideration
he know is far below its reasonable value; or

which

(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20,

a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business
dealing in or collecting
used or secondhand merchandise

is

or

personal
property,
or an agent, employee, or representative
of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains

property and fails to require the seller
delivering
to the property to [provide
information].

or person
verifying

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995) (emphasis added). If the
legislature had intended mere possession of property to be
sufficient to presume intent in a possession case, it would have
included such a presumption.

The trial court disregarded Utah

Code Ann. § 76-1-503 by submitting a presumption to the jury that
has not been recognized by statute or at common law.
3. This Court's Ruling in Perez
Issues in This Case.

Is Inapplicable to the

Finally, the state has recognized that in the past, the Utah
Supreme Court has found error when an instruction patterned after
Section 76-6-402 has been submitted to the jury.

(S.B. at 35

(citing State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Utah 1986)
(instructing the jury in the statutory language was error);
Chambers, 709 P.2d at 327 (instruction was erroneous and
confusing to the jury); State v. Crowder 197 P.2d 917 (Utah 1948)
(error to instruct jury with regard to statutory language))).6

6

In Carlson's original brief, he recognized that the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987),
appears to have retreated from Chambers without discussion. The court
(continued...)
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A different result was reached in State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1
(Utah App. 1996), petition for cert, filed (Utah 11/5/96) (No.
960476). In that case, defendant was charged with possession.
The state submitted an instruction differing in part from the
Instruction in this case. This Court upheld that instruction.
Perez is distinguishable from this matter in several respects.
First, as set forth in Point I.B.2. and I.C.I., supra, the
Instruction in this case permits the jury to presume mental
culpability after it has determined defendant's explanation of
possession is not satisfactory "beyond a reasonable doubt." (R.
110.)

The Instruction stated, " [I]f you find from the evidence

and beyond a reasonable doubt . . .
explanation of such possession has

(4) that no satisfactory
been

criven

or appears from the

evidence, then you may infer from those facts and find that the
defendant stole the property and knew the property was stolen."
(R. 110.)

The emphasized language was not included in the Perez

instruction.

Thus, the Instruction submitted to Carlson's jury

went beyond the instruction submitted in Perez by requiring
Carlson's jury to determine whether the explanation "given" by
Carlson was satisfactory before finding intent.
Second, this Court in Perez did not address the validity of
the instruction in response to the same arguments raised in this

6

(...continued)
cites to Smith in support of the proposition that an instruction
patterned after the statutory presumption set forth at Section 76-6-402
"was not defective." Id. The rationale of that decision is unclear
given the above-cited cases. (Brief of Appellant, dated July 25, 1996,
at 17, n.4.)
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case, where Carlson has pointed out the distinctions between the
"common law" presumption identified in Graves and Barnes, and the
Instruction in this matter (Point I.B. and I.C.I., supra). Graves
and Barnes compel the determination that once the defendant
offers an explanation, the presumption is impermissible.
Third, this Court in Perez did not address whether it is
proper to submit a presumption instruction to the jury under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-503, where such presumption is not established
at common law or under statutory law. (See Point I.C.2., supra.)
Each of the arguments identified in this case, but not discussed
in Perez, were preserved in the trial court in this matter and
must be considered by this Court.
In addition to the distinctions above, the Perez decision is
inapplicable because it is incorrect. It deviates from Smith,
Chambers, and Crowder and is in conflict with Utah law that
possession of recently stolen property alone is insufficient to
sustain a conviction.
The mere possession of stolen property unexplained by the
person in charge thereof is not in and of itself sufficient
to justify a conviction of larceny of the property.[] It
is, however, a circumstance to be considered in connection
with the other evidence in the case in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the possessor. Such possession is
a circumstance tending in some degree to show guilt,
although it is not sufficient, standing alone and
unsupported by other evidence, to warrant a conviction. In
addition to the proof of the larceny and of the possession
by the defendant, there must be proof of corroborating
circumstances tending of themselves to show guilt. Such
corroborating circumstances may consist of the acts,
conduct, falsehoods, if any, or other declarations, if any,
of the defendant which tend to show his guilt.
State v. Heath, 492 P.2d 978, 979 (Utah 1972) (footnote cite
omitted); accord Smith, 726 P.2d at 1235; State v. Clayton, 658
22

P.2d 621, 623 (Utah 1983); State v. Thomas, 244 P.2d 653, 654
(Utah 1952); State v. Nichols, 145 P.2d 802, 805-06 (Utah 1944);
State v. Kinsev, 295 P. 247, 249 (Utah 1931). The Perez ruling is
contrary to established precedent.

Thus, a Petition for

Certiorari has been filed with the Utah Supreme Court in that
matter.

(A copy of the Petition is attached hereto as an

addendum.)

The uncontested petition is pending.

POINT II. THE STATE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PROSECUTORS
CLOSING STATEMENTS AS REFLECTING ON THE EVIDENCE IS
INCORRECT.
As set forth in Carlson's initial brief, in closing argument
the prosecutor made improper statements asking the jurors to
place themselves in the position of the used car salesman in this
matter.

He submitted to the jurors that if they saw Carlson

driving in their car, they would not "simply let him walk away."
(R. 293-94.)

The state dismisses such closing remarks as based

on "common sense," and as urging the jury to evaluate the
conflicting and circumstantial evidence. The statements do not
reflect on the evidence, and in similar situations have been
determined improper.

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1224 (Utah

1993) (statements referencing the jury's obligation to society
were improper); State v. Powell, 816 P.2d 86, 89 (Wash. App.
1991) (in a child molestation case, the prosecutor's argument
that a not-guilty verdict would "send a message that children who
reported sexual abuse would not be believed, thereby 'declaring
open season on children,'" was improper), review denied, 824 P.2d
421 (1992); State v. Wainwright, 856 P.2d 163, 168 (Kan. App.
23

1993) (prosecutor's argument in drug case that jury should find
the defendant guilty and send a message that a person "can't come
into this State, make money, profit off the misery and addiction
of others" was improper); McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1221
(Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (comments that death penalty be imposed
for love of the victims and future victims held improper).
Indeed the trial court in this matter apparently considered
the statements improper but not prejudicial, notwithstanding the
conflicting and circumstantial evidence.

(R. 295 (trial court

acknowledged that the argument was "a little pointed" but not
"unduly inflammatory").)
Like the statements made in Dunn, Powell, and Wainwricrht,
the statements in this case do not reflect a discussion of the
evidence.

Their sole function was to appeal to the jurors'

emotions and sympathy for the used car salesman, as well as
concerns for society as a whole.

In addition, the prosecutor's

argument is tantamount to vouching for the credibility of the
used car salesman in this matter, another category of
prosecutorial misconduct. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893
& n.22 (Utah 1989) (court condemned attempt to cloak prosecution
witness with "explicit personal assurances"), cert. denied, 116
S.Ct. 163 (1995).

Here the prosecutor's argument implied the

belief that the used car salesman was telling the truth and that
the jury should believe him because of societal concerns for the
conduct at issue.
With respect to the prejudice analysis, the state fails to
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acknowledge that Carlson's defense hinged on his lack of mental
culpability, and his defense was presented to the jury in the
form of his testimony, which in part conflicted with the
testimony of the used car salesman. By vouching for the testimony
of the used car salesman, the prosecutor impinged on Carlson's
right to a fair trial.

In addition, since the jurors were asked

to weigh conflicting evidence and interpretations, it is more
likely they were improperly influenced through the prosecutor's
remarks. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984); State
v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and as set forth in the initial
Brief, Carlson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
conviction and judgment entered in the trial court and remand the
case to the trial court for a new trial.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Respondent,
v.
TONY PEREZ,

Case No.
Case No. 950333-CA

Appellant/Petitioner.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the court of appeals erred in approving a

jury instruction premised on the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6402(1) (1995), that erroneously stated that the jury could convict
based on nothing more than possession of recently stolen property?

2.

Whether the court of appeals erred in finding the

hearsay exclusion of defendant's explanation harmless by extending
the harmless error rule announced in the concurring opinion in
State v.

Butler,

560

P.2d

1136, 1140

(Utah

1977)

(Hall,

J.,

concurring) to the situation where previously excluded evidence is
allowed in, but not over objection?

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals in State v. Perez,
298 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah App. Sept. 6, 1996) is attached hereto
as Appendix 1.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
On September 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued its
opinion in this case.

This Court granted Petitioner an extension

of time in which to file this Petition for Writ of Certiorari up to
and including November 5, 1996. Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp. 1996) and Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-4 (1992).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1995) provides:
Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made,
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in
possession stole the property.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant Tony Perez was charged with theft by

receiving

stolen property, a Chevrolet Cavalier, and driving without being
licensed.

R. 79-80.x

A two day jury trial was held on the 22nd

(R. 148-306) and 23rd (R. 307-54) of March, 1995.
convicted
entry).

of both

counts.

R.

119-20

Mr. Perez was

(verdicts),

128

(minute

Mr. Perez was sentenced to concurrent statutory terms of

one to fifteen years and 90 days.

R. 130-1.

On appeal, the State confessed error that the evidence
did not support the driving while unlicensed conviction, and the

x

Mr. Perez was originally charged in the alternative with
theft by receiving and receiving or transferring a stolen motor
vehicle (Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1993), second degree
felony), but the alternative claim of receiving or transferring was
dropped at trial. R. 281-6, 309-10.
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court of appeals correctly vacated that conviction.

Perez, 298

Utah Adv. Rep. at 15 n.2, 17. The court found that the trial court
erroneously excluded admissible defense evidence as hearsay, but
that the error was harmless under State v. Butler.
Rep. at 15-16.

2 98 Utah Adv.

Finally, the court of appeals held that instruction

19, premised on Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) , was proper.

298 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 16-17.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Perez was stopped by police in the company of two
others driving a vehicle that had been stolen earlier that day.

R.

207-15, 218, 199. At trial on the charge of theft by receiving the
stolen car, the only real issue in controversy was the state of
mind of Mr. Perez:

whether he knew, or believed that the car

probably had been stolen.
Over objection, the trial court gave jury instruction 19,
which read:
Possession of property recently stolen, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession
of the stolen property stole the property and knew that
it was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond
a reasonable doubt
(1)
that the defendant was in
possession of property,
(2)
that the property was
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in
point of time from the theft, and
(4)
that no
satisfactory explanation appears from the evidence, then
you may infer from these facts and find that the
defendant stole the property and knew the property was
stolen.
R. 98 (attached as Appendix 2) .
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The trial court repeatedly sustained objections to Mr.
Perez

testifying

concerning

statements

made

to

him

by

Jose

Alcantor, which were directly relevant on the issue of whether Mr.
Perez knew or had reason to believe that the car was stolen:
Q
Okay. Who was driving?
A
I didn't know at first. He called me over to
the car, he said, "Tony, Tony."
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained as to
what he said.
MR. YOUNGBERG: Okay. We're not offering that
for the truth of the matter asserted; just to explain his
actions.
THE COURT: I don't know where it's going. So
I haven't heard what he has said, nor do I know what
you're offering it for. But the objection is sustained,
objection to hearsay.
R. 289,
Q
A

Q

Did he represent that the car was his?
Yeah, he did.
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MS. BYRNE: Hearsay.
THE COURT: It's sustained and stricken.
(BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Did he have the keys to the

car?
A
Q
stolen?
A

He did have the keys.
Did he give you any reason to think it was

None at all. He told me he bought the car.
MS. BYRNE: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Perez, don't tell
us what anybody else said.
THE WITNESS: All right,
THE COURT: All right?
THE WITNESS: All right.
292
Q

And why did you flee from the scene?
MR. YOUNGBERG: Your Honor, I believe this is
going to call for a statement by the other individual,
however we're not offering that to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, simply to explain his actions in
fleeing.
4

THE COURT: Well, I haven't heard an objection
as to what- - are you going to make one?
MS. BYRNE: May we approach the bench, Your
Honor?
THE COURT: You may, yes.
(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of
the jury.)
Q
(BY MR. YOUNGBERG) So there came a time when
you took off, right?
A
Yeah.
Q
All right.
Without going into what anybody
told you, did somebody say something that made you run?
A
Yeah.
R. 297-8.
The only evidence Mr. Perez was successful in adducing
was the following:
Q
A

So why did you run, Tony?
Because he told me the car was stolen.
MS. BYRNE: Objection.
THE COURT: Objection sustained.
Q
(BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Were you afraid?
A
I was afraid.
Q
What were you afraid of?
A
About getting caught with another stolen car.
Q
How about Mr. al Cantor?
A
He didn't look scared about anything. He was
jumpy, but he wasn't scared.
Q
So the bottom line is you ran because why, you
were scared?
A
No, because the car was stolen.
Q
When did you find out the car was stolen?
A
When they took us to the side of the road.
Q
And how did you find out the car was stolen?
A
From Mr. al Cantor.
Q
Up to that point did you know that the car was
stolen?
A
No.
Q
Did you have any- - In Your mind did you have
any reason to think that car was stolen?
A
No.
R. 299.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPROVING
JURY INSTRUCTION 19.
Jury

instruction

nineteen,

attached

as

Appendix

2,

provided:
Possession of property recently stolen, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession
of the stolen property stole the property and knew that
it was stolen.
Thus, if you find f rom the evidence and beyond
a reasonable doubt
(1)
that the defendant was in
possession of property,
(2)
that the property was
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in
point of time from the theft, and
(4)
that no
satisfactory explanation appears from the evidence, then
you may infer from these facts and find that the
defendant stole the property and knew the property was
stolen.
R. 98 (attached as Addendum A) .
This instruction derives from Utah Code Ann. § 76-6402(1) (1995), which provides:
Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made,
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in
possession stole the property.

A.

INSTRUCTION
UTAH LAW.

19

ERRONEOUSLY

MIS-STATED

No instruction given2 advised the jury that possession of
instructions 1 through 14 were boilerplate instructions
concerning juror duties, evidence, burden of proof, and the like.
R. 81-93. Instructions 15 through 18 were elements and definition
instructions for theft by receiving. R. 94-97. Instruction 19 is
the challenged inference instruction.
R. 98.
Instructions 20
through 22 were elements instructions for lesser included offenses.
(continued...)
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recently

stolen

property

alone

is

insufficient

to

sustain

a

conviction, though that is clearly the law in Utah:
The mere possession of stolen
property
unexplained by the person in charge thereof is not in and
of itself sufficient to justify a conviction of larceny
of the property." It is, however, a circumstance to be
considered in connection with the other evidence in the
case in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the possessor. Such possession is a circumstance tending
in some degree to show guilt, although it is not
sufficient, standing alone and unsupported by other
evidence, to warrant a conviction. In addition to the
proof of the larceny and of the ^possession by the
defendant, there must be proof of
corroborating
circumstances tending of themselves to show guilt. Such
corroborating circumstances may consist of the acts,
conduct, falsehoods, if any, or other declarations, if
any, of the defendant which tend to show his guilt.
State v. Heath, 492 P.2d

978, 979

(Utah 1972)

(footnote

cite

omitted); accord State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1986);
State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 621, 623 (Utah 1983); State v. Thomas,
244 P.2d 653, 654 (Utah a 1952);
805-6 (Utah 1944);
Contrary
possession

of

sufficient

to

State v. Nichols, 145 P.2d 802,

State v. Kinsev, 295 P. 247, 249 (1931).
to

law,

recently
sustain

instruction

stolen
a

19

property,

conviction.

2

That

here

states

standing
the

alone,

State

that
IS

adduced

( . ..continued)
R. 99-103. Instructions 23 through 25 defined mental states, and
differentiated intent from motive.
R. 104-6.
Instruction 26
stated that both prohibited conduct and a culpable mental state
must be proven.
R. 107.
Instruction 27 concerned accomplice
liability. R. 108. Instruction 28 was an elements instruction for
driving while unlicensed. R. 109. Instruction 29 defined "on or
about" (R. 110), instruction 30 concerned flight (R. Ill),
instruction 31 concerned mistake of fact (R. 112), instruction 32
advised that punishment lies in the province of the court (R. 113) ,
instruction 33 concerned initial conduct in deliberations (R. 114) ,
and instruction 34 advised that not all instructions may be
necessary (R. 115) .
The instructions conclude with a verdict
instruction. R. 116-7.
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additional evidence concerning flight and possible prevarications
is adequate to survive a sufficiency challenge, but does nothing to
alter the result that the jury was misinstructed and informed that
it could convict under circumstances that, standing alone, are
insufficient to sustain a conviction.
This error is prejudicial.

In State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d

1201 (Utah 1993), this Court reversed a murder conviction for plain
error because of an erroneous instruction!
Under the instruction given, the jury could have
mistakenly believed that reckless conduct alone is
sufficient to prove murder in the second degree.
Second, because the second degree murder statute does not
include the word "recklessness" in describing the actor's
mental state and the manslaughter statute does, we think
the error should have been obvious to the trial judge.
Third, we find that the error was prejudicial because we
cannot be sure that the jury did not convict Dunn on the
basis of a reckless mental state alone.
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209.

Here, we cannot be sure that the jury did

not convict based on mere possession of recently stolen property.
As in Dunn, reversal is necessary.

Given that here there was a

contemporaneous objection at trial, reversal is more' appropriate
here than in Dunn.
Though briefed by Mr. Perez, Opening Brief at 18-22, the
court of appeals failed to even acknowledge this argument in its
opinion.
trial

If the court of appeals decision is allowed to stand,

courts

will

rely

on

the

opinion

and

instruct

juries

incorrectly in future theft by receiving cases throughout Utah.
This Court should correct this error at this time.
The

court

of

appeals

decision

is

in

irreconcilable

conflict with Heath, Smith, Clayton, Thomas, and Kinsev.
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As a

result of this conflict with Supreme Court precedent, this Court
should grant certiorari review.

See Utah R. App. P. 46(a) (2) . The

court of appeals should be reversed, and Mr. Perez should be
granted a new trial.

B.

UNDER CHAMBERS. INSTRUCTIONS PREMISED ON
§ 76-6-402(1) "IN ANY FORM" ARE IMPROPER
AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN.

In State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321

(Utah 1985), this

Court held that an instruction using the verbatim language of § 766-402(1)

was

unconstitutional

because

it

created

a

mandatory

rebuttable presumption that relieved the State of its burden of
persuasion on all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d
344

(1985)

(rejecting instruction that provided

"The acts of a

person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product
of the person's will, but the presumption may be rebutted.") . The
presence of a further instruction couching the presumption
permissive terms failed to cure the problem.

in

709 P.2d at 326.

While rejecting the instruction, this Court upheld the
validity of the statute, noting:
The statute itself, however is addressed to the court and
merely provides a standard by which to determine whether
the evidence presented warrants submission to the jury.

Thus, the statutory
language should not be used in any
form in instructing
juries in criminal cases, and we
expressly
disavow the language and holdings
of our
earlier cases to the contrary.
Chambers,

709

P.2d

at

327

(emphasis added);

accord.

State v.

Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985) (following Chambers and holding
9

instruction was reversible error), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 813, 107
S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed.2d

22

(1986).

Under Chambers, instructions

derived from Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) should not be used to
instruct

juries.

The

instruction

here

was

error

under

the

supervisory authority exercised in Chambers.
State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986), is not to the
contrary.

While finding the challenged instruction erroneous, the

court emphasized that use of "if" and "may"* rendered application of
the inference permissive:
Thus, the court explained that the statutory language
incorporated in the instruction allowed only an
inference
of guilt, and then only if justified by the facts.
Indeed, the court made the same point even more
extensively in a later instruction.1
We do not believe that the jury, in the face of
these instructions, could have reasonably applied the
instructions in an unconstitutional manner.
Furthermore, the trial court explained to the
jury that possession alone of a stolen object is not
sufficient to support a conviction, a rule that has been
reiterated in numerous opinions.
[cites and quotes
omitted]
The Court also instructed:
The mere fact that a person was in conscious
possession of recently stolen property is not
sufficient to justify a conviction of theft. There
must be proof of other circumstances tending of
themselves to establish guilt. However, such proof
need not be established by additional evidence or
witnesses if you find that the possession occurred
under circumstances which warrants [sic] a finding
of guilty.
In this, connection you may consider
the defendant's conduct, any false or contradictory
statements, and any other statements the defendant
may have made with reference to the property. If
the defendant gives a false account of how he
acquired possession of stolen property this is a
circumstance that may tend to show guilt.
In the absence of evidence as to why the
defendant was in possession of recently stolen
10

property, you may infer that the defendant stole
the property.
Smith,

726

P. 2d

at

1234-5

& n.l.

This

Court

"emphatically

declare [d] that we do not retreat from Chambers," 726 P. 2d at 1235,
and held "only that the instruction cannot be deemed reversible
error in this case in light of the clear explanatory instructions
that all that the jury could make of the term 'prima
permissible inference."

facie'

was a

726 P.2d at 1236.

While the instruction here created only a permissive
inference, the additional instructions found critical in Smith were
absent here.

The jury was not instructed that mere possession

alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction.

To the contrary,

instruction 19 affirmatively instructed that mere possession alone
is sufficient, despite the fact that this is erroneous under the
law.

Individually, and in conjunction with the erroneous hearsay

exclusion of Mr. Perez' proffered testimony concerning his good
faith belief that the car was not stolen, this error prejudiced Mr.
Perez.
Contrary to Chambers, the court of appeals held that the
instruction here was not error.

The court of appeals decision is

in irreconcilable conflict with Chambers.

As a result of this

conflict with Supreme Court precedent, this Court should grant
certiorari review.

See Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(2).

The court of

appeals should be reversed, and Mr. Perez should be granted a new
trial.
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POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THE
HEARSAY
EXCLUSION
OF
DEFENDANTS
EXPLANATION HARMLESS BY EXTENDING THE HARMLESS
ERROR RULE ANNOUNCED IN THE CONCURRING OPINION
IN STATE V. BUTLER, 560 P. 2D 1136, 1140 (UTAH
1977) (HALL, J., CONCURRING) TO THE SITUATION
WHERE PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE IS ALLOWED
IN, BUT NOT OVER OBJECTION.
The trial court repeatedly sustained objections to Mr.
Perez

testifying

concerning

statements

made

to

him

by

Jose

Alcantor, which were directly relevant on the issue of whether Mr.
Perez knew or had reason to believe that the car was stolen:
Q
Okay. Who was driving?
A
I didn't know at first. He called me over to
the car, he said, "Tony, Tony."
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained as to
what he said.
MR. YOUNGBERG: Okay. We're not offering that
for the truth of the matter asserted; just to explain his
actions.
THE COURT: I don't know where it's going. So
I haven't heard what he has said, nor do I know what
you're offering it for. But the objection is sustained,
objection to hearsay.
R. 289.
Q
A

Q

Did he represent that the car was his?
Yeah, he did.
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MS. BYRNE: Hearsay.
THE COURT: It's sustained and stricken.
(BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Did he have the keys to the

car?
A
Q
stolen?
A

He did have the keys.
Did he give you any reason to think it was

None at all. He told me he bought the car.
MS. BYRNE: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Perez, don't tell
us what anybody else said.
THE WITNESS: All right.
THE COURT: All right?
THE WITNESS: All right.
12

292.
Q

And why did you flee from the scene?
MR. YOUNGBERG: Your Honor, I believe this is
going to call for a statement by the other individual,
however we're not offering that to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, simply to explain his actions in
fleeing.
THE COURT: Well, I haven't heard an objection
as to what- - are you going to make one?
MS. BYRNE: May we approach the bench, Your
Honor?
THE COURT: You may, yes.
(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of
the jury.)
Q
(BY MR. YOUNGBERG) So there came a time when
you took off, right?
A
Yeah.
Q
All right.
Without going into what anybody
told you, did somebody say something that made you run?
A
Yeah.
297-8.
The only evidence Mr. Perez was successful in adducing
the following:
Q
A

So why did you run, Tony?
Because he told me the car was stolen.
MS. BYRNE: Objection.
THE COURT: Objection sustained.
Q
(BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Were you afraid?
A
I was afraid.
Q
What were you afraid of?
A
About getting caught with another stolen car.
Q
How about Mr. al Cantor?
A
He didn't look scared about anything. He was
jumpy, but he wasn't scared.
Q
So the bottom line is you ran because why, you
were scared?
A
No, because the car was stolen.
Q
When did you find out the car was stolen?
A
When they took us to the side of the road.
Q
And how did you find out the car was stolen?
A
From Mr. al Cantor.
Q
Up to that point did you know that the car was
stolen?
A
No.
Q
Did you have any- - In Your mind did you have
any reason to think that car was stolen?
A
No.
13

R. 299.
The

court

of

appeals properly

found

that

the

trial

court's repeated exclusion of defendant's proffered evidence on
hearsay grounds was error.

298 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. However, the

court of appeals erroneously concluded that these errors were
harmless, relying on State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1140 (Hall,
J., concurring).
In Butler, it was asserted that the trial court had
erroneously sustained hearsay objections to statements made by a
homicide victim offered by defendant to show that the defendant was
operating

under

the

influence

of

extreme

mental

or

emotional

disturbance.
In fact, the court allowed defendant to
testify, over objection,
about the conversation with his
wife wherein she related that the victim had threatened
defendant with bodily harm.
In light of this ruling
allowing hearsay, the prior ruling prohibiting it, if
error at all, was harmless error.
Butler, 560 P.2d at 1140 (Hall, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
In the instant

case, the trial court had

repeatedly

sustained unfounded hearsay objections to Mr. Perez testifying
concerning statements made to him by Jose Alcantor to the effect
that Mr. Alcantor had purchased the car.

The evidence Mr. Perez

was able to get in was immediately preceded by the trial court
sustaining an objection to Mr. Perez testifying that Mr. Alcantor
told him for the first time at the scene of the traffic stop that
the car was stolen.
The State did not object to the testimony that finally
came in.

Coming hot on the heels of the prior erroneous rulings,
14

R. 289, 291, 292, 297-8, 299, there can be no confidence that the
jury accepted this evidence at face value. Had the State objected,
and the objection been overruled, the evidence would stand on a
different footing, and Butler would be applicable. The jury would
have a clear directive from the court that it should consider the
evidence, and the prior errors would thus arguably be harmless.
In this case, every directive from the court was that the
jury could not consider the evidence proffered by Mr. Perez.

It is

entirely possible, and in fact probable, that the jury disregarded
this testimony because the trial court had repeatedly sustained
objections to this testimony. The trial court had even admonished
Mr. Perez that he was not allowed to tell the jury anything that
anyone else had said:
Q
stolen?
A

Did he give you any reason to think it was

None at all. He told me he bought the car.
MS. BYRNE: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Perez, don't tell
us what anybody else said.
THE WITNESS: All right.
THE COURT: All right?
THE WITNESS: All right.
R. 292.

Given this incorrect guidance from the court, the jury

probably felt constrained to disregard the explanation proffered by
Mr. Perez.

Individually, and in conjunction with the erroneous

jury instruction, Mr. Perez was prejudiced.
This Court should grant certiorari review to correct the
error of the court of appeals, and the unwarranted extension of
Butler to a situation where it is inapposite.
46(a) (2) .
15
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CONCLUSION
For

the

forgoing

reasons,

petitioner

respectfully

requests that this Court grant certiorari review.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

S

day of November, 1996.
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Opinion in State v. Perez, 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah
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State v. Perez

Code«Co
Provo, Utah

298 Utah Adv. Rep. 14

agree that under such an interpretation, u an
attorney's fee 'presupposes a relationship of
attorney and client1 which does not exist in pro
se situations." Id. (citing Davis v. Parratt, 608
F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979)). It is our view
that a law firm does not "incur" fees when it
uses its own attorneys in a collection action.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court was
correct in ruling that plaintiff was not entitled to
attorney fees in its pro se collection action
against Dawson.

1. It is interesting to note that Mr. Shelton's fees to
his counsel for the divorce action were $19,640,
which corresponds closely to Shaw's original high-end
projection.
2. The Utah rule is usubstantially the same as rule 8,
F.R.C.P." Utah R. Civ. P. 8, at 22 (Compiler's
Notes).

Cite as

CONCLUSION
We direct that the judgment of the trial court
be amended to award plaintiff a total of $18,000
less amounts paid by Dawson, together with
interest on the unpaid balance thereof for
plaintiffs representation of Dawson in the trial
court in the divorce action. Fees which have
been awarded for plaintiffs work on appeal of
the divorce case are not disturbed by this ruling
since no specific challenge to these fees appears
in the briefs. The trial court's denial of fees to
plaintiff for its pro se representation in this
action is affirmed.
As a postscript to our decision, we observe
that the events that brought this case to this
court are disturbing. Dawson was awarded
rehabilitative alimony of $1,400 per month for
a two-year period, but because plaintiff was
successful in tying up those funds, she was
denied the timely benefit of that award. Plaintiff
withdrew from representing Dawson while the
appeal of the divorce case was pending and
retained Dawson's file, claiming an attorney's
lien on it. She was obliged to engage new
counsel who successfully defended the appeal
without the file. The Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct allow an attorney to withdraw from
representation for nonpayment of fees if the
client has been given adequate warning. Utah R.
Professional Conduct 1.14(b)(4) (1995). The
rules require, however, that upon termination of
representation, "a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's
interests, such as surrendering papers and
property to which the client is entitled." Utah R.
Professional Conduct 1.14(d) (1995). Plaintiff
failed to protect Dawson's best interest when it
refused to surrender her file in derogation of
that rule.
We urge members of the Bar to be clear and
fair in their fee negotiations with clients and to
avoid the misunderstandings that brought this
case about. Fees should not be driven by billable
hour requirements imposed by lawyers on
themselves and by their firms. Moreover, when
disputes do arise, attorneys should settle them
without resorting to tying up rehabilitative
alimony and retaining files to coerce payment.
Chief Justice Zimmerman, Justice Durham,
and Justice Russon concur in Justice Howe's
opinion.
Having disqualified himself, Associate Chief
Justice Stewart does not participate herein.

298 Utah Adv. Rep. 14
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Tony PEREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 950333-CA
FILED: September 6, 1996
Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division
I
The Honorable David S. Young
ATTORNEYS:
Robin K. Youngberg and Robert K.
Heineman, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and James H. Beadles, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee
Before Judges Davis, Billings, and Garff.1
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant Tony Perez appeals his convictions
for driving while unlicensed, a Class C
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§53-3-202 (Supp. 1995), and theft by receiving
stolen property, a second degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1995).
We affirm defendant's conviction of theft by
receiving but vacate defendant's conviction for
driving without a license.
FACTS
On February 4, 1995, Bernie Gonzales
reported to police that his car was stolen from
his driveway. That afternoon, Utah Highway
Patrol Trooper Kathy Slagowski pulled over his
car because she saw the passenger smoking what
she thought was a marijuana cigarette. Despite
her request, none of the occupants of the car
produced identification. Trooper Slagowski
testified that "the driver [the defendant] told me
he didn't have his driver's license with him, or
didn't have one, I don't recall." Tmnts+r

Code«Co
Provo, Utah

State v. ]
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Slagowski then asked the three individuals to
stand by the guard rail while she radioed for
backup.
While Trooper Slagowski was calling for
backup, defendant and his passengers ran across
the six-lane freeway. The trooper informed the
dispatch office of the escape and two officers
responded. The police eventually found
defendant and his passengers hiding in a
warehouse.
After defendant's apprehension, he gave
conflicting stories to the police. Defendant told
Trooper Dan Ferguson that he did not know the
car was stolen because one of the passengers,
Jose Al Cantor, had picked him up and that he
ran because he thought Al Cantor had drugs or
guns. Initially, defendant also told Trooper Mike
Cowdell that Al Cantor had picked him up in the
car, but later claimed they had asked to borrow
the car from the owner.
Defendant was charged with theft by receiving
stolen property, and driving without being
licensed. During the trial, the court repeatedly
sustained the State's hearsay objections to
defendant's testimony of statements made to him
by Jose Al Cantor regarding whether he knew
the car was stolen. The trial court also gave a
juiy instruction on receipt of stolen property
over defendant's objection. Defendant was
convicted of driving without being licensed and
theft by receiving stolen property.
Defendant now appeals, claiming the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction for
driving without being licensed,2 the trial court
erred in sustaining the hearsay objections, the
trial court improperly instructed the jury on
receipt of stolen property, and that cumulative
error mandates reversal.3
I. HEARSAY
Defendant claims the trial court erred in
sustaining the State's repeated hearsay objections
to defendant's testimony of statements made to
him by Jose Al Cantor as they were not offered
for the truth of the matters stated but only to
establish defendant's actions in response to these
statements.
Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant. . . , offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah
R. Evid. 801(c) (emphasis added). "However, if
an out-of-court statement is 'offered simply to
prove that it was made, without regard to
whether it is true, such testimony is not
proscribed by the hearsay rule/" State v. Olsen,
860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v.
Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah 1980)).
Whether a statement is offered for the truth of
the matter asserted is a question of law, which
we review under a correction of error standard.
Id.
The following colloquies occurred between
defendant and his defense counsel at trial:
Q Did he represent that the car was his?
A Yeah, he did.

MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MS. BYRNE: Hearsay.
THE COURT: It's sustained and stricken.
Q (By MR. YOUNGBERG) Did he have
the keys to the car?
A He did have the keys.
Q Did he give you any reason to think it
was stolen?
A None at all. He told me he bought the
car.
MS. BYRNE: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Perez, don't
tell us what anybody else said.
THE WITNESS: All right.
THE COURT: All right?
THE WITNESS: All right.
Q And why did you flee from the scene?
MR. YOUNGBERG: Your Honor, I believe
this is going to call for a statement by the
other individual, however we're not offering
that to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, simply to explain his actions in
fleeing.
THE COURT: Well, I haven't heard an
objection as to what—are you going to make
one?
MS. BYRNE: May we approach the bench,
Your Honor?
Q (MR. YOUNGBERG) So there came a
time when you took off, right?
A Yeah.
Q All right. Without going into what
anybody told you, did somebody say
something that made you run?
A Yeah.
Q So why did you run, Tony?
A Because somebody told me the car was
stolen.
MS. BYRNE: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
We agree that defendant was not trying to
prove whether Mr. Al Cantor stole the car.
Rather, defendant was merely offering an
explanation for his actions. Thus, the truth or
falsity of Mr. Al Cantor's statements is
immaterial. Therefore, we conclude these
statements were not hearsay and were
improperly excluded at trial.
However, "[w]e may not interfere with a jury
verdict unless upon review of the entire record,
there emerges error of sufficient gravity to
indicate that a defendant's rights were prejudiced
in a substantial manner." State v. Salmon, 612
P.2d 366, 370 (Utah 1980). We must find,
absent the error, "a reasonable probability there
would have been a result more favorable to
defendant." Id.
Defendant admits the excluded evidence
eventually came in through subsequent
questioning. Nonetheless, defendant claims his
subsequent testimony was not enough to cure the^
court's error. We disagree.
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Defendant had the following exchange with his
defense counsel at trial:
Q So the bottom line is you ran because
why, you were scared?
A No, because the car was stolen.
Q When did you find out the car was
stolen?
A When they took us to the side of the
road.
Q And how did you find out the car was
stolen?
A From Mr. Al Cantor.
Q Up to that point did you know that the car
was stolen?
A No.
Q Did you have any—In your mind did you
have any reason to think that [the] car was
stolen?
A No.
In this exchange, defendant was able to testify
that he did not know the car was stolen until
they were being detained, that he had no reason
to believe the car was stolen until that point in
time, and that he ran because he had just been
told the car was stolen. These statements formed
the basis of defendant's defense and were the
substance of the erroneously excluded testimony.
Once the court allowed the testimony to come
in, any prior ruling prohibiting it was harmless
error. See State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1140
(Utah 1977) (Hall, J., concurring). Therefore,
we conclude defendant was not prejudiced by the
court's evidentiary rulings.
H. JURY INSTRUCTION
Next, defendant claims the trial court
improperly instructed the jury as to receipt of
stolen property because the language of the
instruction improperly shifted the burden of
proof to defendant.
The instruction at issue derives, in part, from
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) (1995), which
provides:
Possession of property recently stolen, when
no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence that the person in possession
stole the property.
There is considerable Utah case law
addressing jury instructions dealing with this
statutory presumption. State v. Chambers, 709
P.2d 321 (Utah 1985), is an appropriate place to
begin our analysis. The instruction in Chambers
quoted section 76-6-402(1) verbatim. The court
held that using the language of section
76-6-402(1) created an
unconstitutional
mandatory rebuttable presumption, which
"'requires the jury to find the element unless the
defendant persuades the jury that such a finding
is unwarranted,'" and thus improperly relieves
the State of its burden of proof. Id. at 326
(quoting Francis v. Franklin, All U.S. 307, 314
n.2, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 1971 n.2 (1985)). The
court noted that the question of a prima facie
case is a question of law for the court to
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sufficient to submit to the jury. Id. at 327. Thus,
to give such a charge "'would only be
confiising'" to the jury. Id. (citation omitted).
The Chambers court concluded "the statutory
language should not be used in any form." Id.
Nevertheless, the Chambers court emphasized
that section 76-6-402(1), upon which the
instruction was based, had no constitutional
infirmity when properly construed. Id. at 326.
The court cited with approval State v. Asay, 631
P.2d 861 (Utah 1981), where the following
instruction based on section 76-6-402(1) was
approved: "You are further instructed that one
who is found to be in possession of property
recently stolen may be found to be the guilty
person unless he gives a satisfactory explanation
of his possession thereof." Id. at 863 (emphasis
added).
In a subsequent case, State v. Smith, 726 P.2d
1232 (Utah 1986), the supreme court clarified its
holding in Chambers and upheld a jury
instruction even though it included the statutory
language. Id. at 1235-36. The instruction stated:
Utah law provides that:
"Possession of property recently stolen
when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be prima facie
evidence that the person in possession stole
the property."
Thus, if you find from the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant was in possession of stolen
property, that such possession was not too
remote in point of time from the theft, and
the defendant made no
satisfactory
explanation of such possession, then you
may infer from those facts that the defendant
committed the theft.
Id. at 1234 (emphasis added).
The court recognized Chambers's holding
"that a jury instruction using the language of
section 76-6-402(1) is unconstitutional because
it Velievefd] the State of its burden of proof.'"
Id. (citation omitted). The court then explained
j that "[a]n instruction that simply incorporates the
statutory language is unconstitutional when the
statutory term 'prima facie' is defined as a
presumption, as was the case in Chambers.n Id.
I The Smith court emphasized that the instruction
before it, although containing the statutory
j language, "carefully stated that the statutory
j language meant only that if the jury found
certain facts that 'you may infer from those facts
that the defendant committed the theft. *" Id. The
court stated "the statutory language incorporated
I in the instruction allowed only an inference of
guilt, and then only if justified by the facts." Id.
Therefore, although the court held "the trial
court should not have used the statutory
language in the instruction for the reasons stated
in Chambers,11 the instruction could not be
"deemed reversible error . . . in light of the
clear explanatory instructions that all that the
jury could make of the term 'prima facie' was a
permissible inference." Id. at 1235-36. Thus-
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even though the first paragraph of the instruction is insufficient to support a guilty verdict. We
quoted the statute verbatim, the court upheld it commend the State for its candor and reverse
because the context of the instruction as a whole defendant's conviction for driving without being
licensed.
allowed only a permissible inference.
We examine the instruction at issue in light of 3. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will
reverse only if 'the cumulative effect of the several
this authority. The instruction provides::
[otherwise harmless] errors undermines our confidence
Possession of property recently stolen, if
. . . that a fair trial was had.*" State v. Dunn, 850
not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (quoting Whitehead v.
circumstance from
which you
may
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928
reasonably draw the inference and find, in
(Utah 1990)). After a full review of the record and
light of the surrounding
circumstances
our reversal of one of defendant's convictions, the
shown by the evidence in the case, that the
cumulative effect of the identified errors does not
undermine our confidence in the essential fairness of
person in possession of the stolen property
defendant's trial on receiving stolen property.
stole the property and knew that it was
stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the
Cite as
defendant was in possession of property, (2)
298 Utah Adv. Rep. 17
that the property was stolen, (3) thai: such
possession was not too remote in point of
IN THE
time from the theft, and (4) that no
satisfactory explanation appears from the
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
evidence, then you may infer from these
facts and find that the defendant stole the
STATE of Utah,
property and knew the property was stolen.
Plaintiff and Appellee,
(Emphasis added.)
v.
In the second paragraph of this instruction, the
trial court instructed the jury with nearly the Steven M. IRWIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
same permissible inference as in Smith. The
instruction stated only if you find these facts
beyond a reasonable doubt, may you infer from No. 950385-CA
those facts the defendant stole the property or FILED: September 6, 1996
knew the property was stolen. Further, whereas
the first paragraph of the Smith instruction Second District, Ogden Department
quoted the statute verbatim, the first paragraph The Honorable Michael J. Glasmann
of the instruction in this case merely paraphrases
the statutory language, eliminating the confusing ATTORNEYS:
term prima facie and, in fact, emphasizes the Kent E. Snider, Ogden, for Appellant
discretion allowed the fact finder. The Jan Graham and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt
challenged instruction did not improperly shift
Lake City, and Gary Heward, Ogden, for
the burden of proof to defendant, and we
Appellee
therefore conclude the instruction was not error.
Before Judges Orme, Billings, and Jackson.
CONCLUSION
We conclude there was not sufficient evidence
This opinion is subject to revision before
to sustain a conviction for driving while
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
unlicensed, and we vacate that conviction. We
also conclude the trial court erroneously ORME, Presiding Judge:
sustained hearsay objections; however, those
Claiming the prosecution breached the terms
errors were harmless. Finally, we conclude the of his plea agreement, defendant appeals his
challenged jury instruction did not shift the convictions for forcible sexual abuse and
burden of proof to defendant and therefore the unlawful sexual intercourse. We conclude the
instruction was proper. Accordingly, we uphold issue was not preserved for appeal and that
defendant's conviction for theft by receiving "exceptional circumstances" do not exist so as to
stolen property.
permit our consideration of the issue absent
Judith M. Billings, Judge
preservation. Accordingly, we affirm.
WE CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge
FACTS
Regnal W. Garff, Senior Judge
Defendant was charged with rape, a
first-degree felony. At his original arraignment,
he pled not guilty. During the course of
1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff sitting by special investigation, new charges surfaced against
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-4(2) defendant and defendant entered into plea
(1995); Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-108(4).
negotiations with the State. Defendant agreed to
2. Defendant argues and the State concedes that the plead guilty to a second-degree felony, forcible
evidence of defendant's driving without being licensed sexual assault, and a third-decree felnnv

APPENDIX 2
Instruction 19 (R. 98)

INSTRUCTION NO.

Possession

of

property

4

recently

stolen,

if

not

satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that
the person

in possession

of

the

stolen

property

stole

the

property and knew that the property was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt il% that the defendant was in possession of property,

fan

that the property was stolen, ((3)) that ..such possession was not
too remote in point of time from the theft, and

(4) that no

satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts
and find that the defendant stole the property and knew the
property was stolen.

